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DISCUSSION KICK-OFF
The WHO’s new 
emergency powers – from 
SARS to Ebola
The Ebola outbreak is only the third Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) ever declared 
by the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO’s 
emergency authority is based on the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) adopted in 2005. While these regulations 
enable the organization only to recommend measures to 
states, its decisions to declare a PHEIC and to issue 
temporary recommendations are de facto authoritative 
points of reference for global and national containment 
efforts. In fact, the WHO performs well in governing this 
transboundary health crisis, at least compared to earlier 
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outbreaks of infectious diseases. Its actions are assertive but 
transparent, and it has taken a leading role in bioethical 
debates.
This has not always been the case. In terms of emergency 
governance, the WHO has gone through a dialectical process 
of authorization and learning: self-empowerment and excess 
led eventually to the adoption of principles of Global 
Administrative Law (GAL). The GAL-framework provides a 
heuristic to trace and assess mechanisms promoting the 
accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular 
those ensuring their compliance with adequate standards of 
transparency, participation, and review. Still, GAL alone 
cannot be an antidote to the legalized inequalities in global 
health underlying the Ebola epidemic and other neglected 
diseases.
Self-empowerment and excess in WHO crisis response 
The WHO’s “emergency powers” are of relatively recent 
origin. In fact, under the ‘old’ International Health 
Regulations that governed infectious disease management 
since 1951/1969, the WHO had basically no authority other 
than the gathering and dissemination of information. By 1995 
the World Health Assembly eventually instructed the 
Director-General to revise the IHR. Yet, it was only the 
outbreak of SARS in 2002 and the WHO’s exceptional self-
empowerment which created a precedent for the IHR 
revision. The Director-General declared SARS to be a 
‘worldwide health threat’ and issued travel warnings for 
China, Hong Kong, and Canada. Because of its relative 
success, this then extra-legal measure became the blueprint 
for the ‘new’ IHR which authorize the WHO and its 
Emergency Committee to determine the existence of a 
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PHEIC as well as the measures to be implemented for its 
containment.
Once formally empowered, however, the first test case for 
the WHO’s emergency governance capacities – the swine flu 
outbreak in 2009 – rather discredited the organization since 
its reaction was both excessive and highly intransparent. 
First, the Emergency Committee met in secret and the 
names of its members were kept classified for the duration 
of the PHEIC. Journalistic investigations then later 
uncovered close ties of many of its members to the 
pharmaceutical industry, which benefited from the 
declaration of a PHEIC as it boosted demand for available 
medication. Secondly, the WHO Secretariat played fast and 
loose with the criteria of the pandemic alert phases so as to 
fit the worst phase 6 “pandemic” to the relatively low H1N1 
mortality rate. Based on this assessment, the WHO then 
advised its members to order largely dispensable vaccines 
and antiviral medicines.
When it became clear that the swine flu was hardly worse 
than any seasonal influenza, resistance against the WHO 
emergency handling arose. Early in 2010, the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly initiated a public inquiry 
into the WHO’s response to the H1N1 crisis, culminating in a 
highly critical report which noted grave shortcomings in the 
decisionmaking procedures at the WHO during the H1N1 
crisis. The resulting public pressure also made an impression 
on the WHO’s internal review body, whose final report
demanded more transparent procedures in future crises.
Lessons learnt for Ebola
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Its reaction to the Ebola crisis demonstrates that the WHO 
has learnt from previous mistakes. It has enhanced the 
transparency of its emergency measures and proactively 
deals with potential conflicts of interest. Unlike previously, 
the WHO has now published the names of the Emergency 
Committee members in parallel with its recommendations of 
August 8. Additionally, the WHO provides a fact sheet that 
explains how an Emergency Committee is put together and 
how it operates. The same transparency standards were 
applied to the ethics panel that has issued a set of 
considerations to be taken into account regarding the use of 
untested drugs, published on August 12. The panel 
intervened in a heated international debate about the 
adequate use of unregistered medicines. It advised that 
specific treatments and antivirals should be used, even if 
their safety and efficacy are yet to be tested. The WHO 
published the names of the panelists, disclosing also of one 
of the panelists’ relationship with pharmaceutical 
companies. It also pledged to publish a report of the panel’s 
proceedings.
This does not yet amount to a public debate on the issue, but 
it goes at least some way towards addressing the moral 
dilemmas involved in recommending the use of 
pharmaceuticals that are of uncertain value and available in 
insufficient amounts. Reminiscent of post-H1N1 allegations
that the WHO’s pandemic preparedness plans had concealed 
conflicts of interest of the experts involved, and that it had 
recommended antivirals of dubious safety and efficacy, this 
is a major step forward. This increasing deliberative quality 
of bioethical debates surrounding global health emergencies 
cannot do away with tough moral decisions but it creates a 
fairer ground on which to discuss these issues.
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Progress in emergency law amidst an unhealthy legal 
infrastructure
The handling of the current Ebola crisis reflects a learning 
process in the WHO initiated by external and internal 
reviews of its emergency mechanisms. These mechanisms 
have now become more transparent and accountable. At 
least from the GAL-perspective, this is a success story. Yet, 
the Ebola case also demonstrates that underlying questions 
of distribution cannot be resolved by crisis interventions, 
procedurally sound or not. As of yet, the WHO has 
postponed an answer to the question who should have 
priority in getting access to scarce drugs and why. The 
experience of the multi-year intergovernmental negotiations
over access to influenza medication here teaches a sobering 
lesson: Only minor concessions were made to developing 
countries where vaccines and antivirals are often scarce and 
unaffordable. The worldwide enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and global health regulations such as the 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework define a legal 
order that cements health inequalities in a way that is far 
more consequential than single emergency measures.
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